Current attacks to distributed systems involve multiple steps, due to attackers usually taking multiple actions to achieve their goals. Such attacks are called multi-stage attacks and have the ultimate goal to compromise a critical asset for the victim. An example would be compromising a web server, then achieve a series of intermediary steps (such as compromising a developer's box thanks to a vulnerable PHP module and connecting to a FTP server with gained credentials) to ultimately connect to a database where user credentials are stored. Current detection systems are not capable of analyzing the multi-step attack scenario. In this document we present a distributed detection framework based on a probabilistic reasoning engine that communicates to detection sensors and can achieve two goals: (1) protect the critical asset by detecting multi-stage attacks and (2) tune sensors according to the changing environment of the distributed system monitored by the distributed framework. As shown in the experiments, the framework reduces the number of false positives that it would otherwise report if it were only considering alerts from a single detector and the reconfiguration of sensors allows the framework to detect attacks that take advantage of the changing system environment.
Introduction
Current computer attacks against distributed systems involve multiple steps, thanks to attackers usually taking multiple actions to achieve their ultimate goal to compromise a critical asset. Such attacks are called multi-stage attacks (MSA). As today's enterprise systems are structured to protect their critical assets, such as, a mission-critical service or private databases, by placing them inside the periphery, MSAs have gained prominence. Examples include the breach of a large payment processing firm [1] and the breaches published by the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services [24] . MSAs are characterized by progressively achieving intermediate attack steps and progressing using these as stepping stones to achieve the ultimate goal(s). Thus, prior to the critical asset being compromised, multiple components are compromised. Logically, therefore, to detect MSAs, it would be desirable to detect the security state of various components in an enterprise distributed system-the outward facing services as well as those placed inside the periphery. Further, the security state needs to be inferred from the alerts provided by intrusion detection sensors (henceforth, shortened as "sensors") deployed in various parts of the system.
In the context of MSAs against distributed systems, this is challenging because sensors are designed and deployed without consideration for assimilating inputs from multiple detectors to determine how an MSA is spreading through the protected system. Prior work has shown that it is possible to determine the choice and placement of sensors in a systematic manner and at runtime, perform inferencing based on alerts from the sensors to determine the security state of the protected system components [7] 1 . In achieving this, the solutions have performed characterization of individual sensors prior to deployment, in terms of their capability to detect specific attack step goals. At runtime, inferencing has been performed on the basis of the evidence-the alerts from the sensors-to determine the unobservable variables-the security state of the different components of the protected system. The sensors may be either network-based sensors, which observe incoming or outgoing network traffic, or host-based sensors, which observe activities within a host.
However, no existing solution has handled the various sources of dynamism that are to be expected in large-scale protected systems deployed in enterprise settings. The underlying protected system itself changes with time, with the addition or deletion of hosts, ports, software applications, or changes in connectivity between hosts. A static solution is likely to miss new attacks possible in the changed configuration of the protected system as well as throw off false alarms for attack steps that are just not possible under the changed configuration. The nature of attacks may also change with time or the anticipated frequencies of attack paths may turn out to be not completely accurate based on attack traces observed at runtime. Existing solutions cannot update their "beliefs" in an efficient manner and are therefore likely to be less accurate. Finally, when the compromise of a critical asset appears imminent, fast reconfiguration of existing sensors (such as, turning on some rules) may be needed to increase the certainty about the security state of the critical asset. Our contribution in this paper is to show how the choice and placement of sensors can be updated through incremental processing when the above kinds of dynamism occur.
The solution we propose in this paper called Distributed Intrusion and Attack Detection System (DIADS) is to have a central inferencing engine, which has a model of MSAs as attack graphs. DIADS creates a Bayesian Network (BN) out of an attack graph and observable (or evidence) nodes in the attack graph are mapped from sensor alerts. It receives inputs from the sensors and performs inferencing to determine whether a rechoosing or replacement of sensors is needed. Further, it can reconfigure existing sensors, by turning on or off rules or event
